South Africa Foot-and-Mouth Disease Crisis: Why FMD Ran Amok in 2025–26

South Africa is facing what has been described as the country’s worst foot-and-mouth disease (FMD) epidemic, with cattle farms suffering major production losses, prolonged movement restrictions and costly herd-management measures. Farmer accounts published this week show that many producers had prepared for an outbreak, but once the virus entered a susceptible herd, farm-level biosecurity alone was often insufficient to contain it.

A Livestock Disease With National Economic Consequences

Foot-and-mouth disease is one of the world’s most contagious livestock diseases. It affects cattle, pigs, sheep, goats and other cloven-hoofed animals and can spread rapidly through infected animals, contaminated equipment, vehicles, clothing and other materials. WOAH classifies FMD as a major transboundary animal disease because outbreaks can sharply reduce production and disrupt domestic and international trade.

South Africa’s current crisis has developed against a much longer background. The country lost its FMD-free status in 2019, and government has subsequently dealt with recurrent outbreaks and expanding disease-management requirements. In December 2025, the agriculture ministry described the livestock industry affected by FMD as an approximately R80 billion sector.

A September 2 investigation by GroundUp now characterises the 2025–26 episode as South Africa’s worst FMD epidemic, reporting widespread disease among cattle farms and severe financial and emotional consequences for producers.

The farm-level numbers illustrate the scale

At Mearns dairy farm in KwaZulu-Natal, farmer James Kean reported that FMD arrived on 23 January 2026. What began with one symptomatic cow developed into an outbreak in which approximately 1,500 of 1,600 cattle became infected — about 94% of the herd.

The economic impact was substantial. Kean estimated the farm’s outbreak cost at least R7 million, including approximately R3 million in medicines, in addition to higher labour costs and sharply reduced milk production.

Another dairy operation in the Kamberg Valley had a markedly different experience after vaccinating its herd shortly before the outbreak. Of thousands of cattle, approximately 125 became ill, illustrating the potential value of vaccination when adequate protection is established before exposure.

Why Farmers Could See the Risk but Still Struggled

The experience highlights a fundamental problem with FMD control: farm biosecurity reduces risk but cannot create an impermeable barrier around a highly transmissible virus when disease pressure is high.

Farmers interviewed by GroundUp described detailed preparedness measures, yet infection still entered farms. Once established, the consequences went well beyond visible mouth and foot lesions. In dairy cattle, FMD can cause:

• fever and painful oral lesions;

• lameness from foot lesions;

• reduced feed intake;

• teat and udder damage;

• secondary mastitis;

• severe reductions in milk production;

• poor recovery and body-condition loss; and

• premature culling of animals that fail to return to productive performance.

On the Mearns farm, GroundUp reported that affected cows could reduce feed intake from roughly 15–20 kg/day to only 2–3 kg/day during severe illness, while milk output fell sharply. This is why the economic damage of FMD cannot be measured simply by counting animals that die.

Mortality is only part of the loss

Adult mortality from FMD is generally low, although young animals can experience significant mortality, including from myocarditis. The much larger commercial effect in mature livestock can come from production losses, reproductive disruption, secondary disease, chronic damage and culling. WOAH notes that FMD can severely disrupt livestock production and trade even when mortality in adult animals is limited.

For dairy producers, an animal that survives but suffers permanent udder damage or fails to regain productivity can represent a substantial economic loss.

South Africa’s Vaccination Response Accelerated in 2026

The government’s response expanded dramatically during 2026. By 28 May 2026, South Africa had:

The government described the programme as the largest FMD vaccine acquisition programme undertaken by the South African state.

Vaccination coverage was already concentrated in the highest-risk provinces. By May 28, more than 1.1 million animals had been vaccinated in KwaZulu-Natal, over 720,000 in Eastern Cape, more than 600,000 in Free State, over 430,000 each in Mpumalanga and North West, and more than 350,000 in Limpopo.

The government subsequently reported procuring 13.5 million doses since February and described vaccine availability as having reached unprecedented levels for the country.

The Vaccine Timing Problem

The South African experience also demonstrates why vaccination capacity cannot simply be switched on after an outbreak begins. In December 2025, the government set a target of:

• approximately 70% reduction in FMD incidents in high-risk areas over 24 months;

• 90% vaccination coverage in targeted communal, commercial and feedlot populations; and

• 100% vaccination of dairy cattle.

By June 2026, the programme had already vaccinated millions of animals, but the government acknowledged that South Africa had historically operated largely through a reactive rather than preventative biosecurity model. It said the new approach required rebuilding vaccine supply chains, surveillance, diagnostics and inter-provincial coordination. That distinction is critical.

FMD control is not simply a question of having a vaccine. It requires the right vaccine match, sufficient supply, timely administration, booster programmes, surveillance and movement controls before the virus reaches susceptible populations.

The Disease Is Not a Human Food-Safety Threat

One of the most important messages for consumers is that foot-and-mouth disease is not the same disease as hand, foot and mouth disease in humans.

FMD is an animal disease and does not pose a normal public-health or food-safety threat to people. The UK government explicitly classifies FMD as not a public-health or food-safety risk, while WOAH identifies it as a livestock disease.

There is therefore no scientific basis for treating ordinary consumers as being at risk of contracting FMD from eating properly handled meat or drinking properly processed dairy products.

For milk, pasteurization provides an important food-safety control, and Germany’s Federal Institute for Risk Assessment notes that no human cases have been reported from consuming pasteurized milk or dairy products. Raw milk, however, can carry other pathogenic microorganisms and should not be treated as equivalent to pasteurized milk.

For meat, the correct message is different: meat is not “pasteurized.” Products from affected animals are subject to veterinary inspection, slaughter controls, movement restrictions and trade rules designed to prevent disease spread. FMD itself is not considered a human foodborne disease.

FMD Is Becoming a Biosecurity and Trade Issue

The South African outbreak is increasingly being viewed as more than an animal-health problem. Government data show the scale of the response required to protect the livestock economy, while the disruption to livestock movement affects farmers, feedlots, processors, abattoirs and exporters.

In June, the agriculture ministry reported that Jordan remained open to South African exports, while the UAE, Hong Kong and Kuwait continued accepting products under specified conditions. The government was also engaging Tunisia, Lebanon, Egypt, Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia on risk-based trade arrangements.

The country’s agricultural sector generated an estimated US$7.3 billion trade surplus in 2025, according to the agriculture ministry, highlighting why animal-health controls have consequences beyond individual farms.

The Bigger Lesson: Prevention Has to Start Before the First Sick Animal

The most significant lesson from the 2025–26 FMD wave is not that farmers failed to prepare. The evidence suggests something more complicated.

Farmers implemented biosecurity measures. Some vaccinated and experienced dramatically lower infection levels. Others nevertheless saw disease move rapidly through their herds. The problem is therefore systemic rather than simply farm-level.

Effective national FMD control requires a coordinated system combining:

Early surveillance → rapid diagnostics → matched vaccines → high coverage → booster programmes → livestock identification → movement controls → farm biosecurity → regional coordination → trade compartmentalisation.

South Africa’s government has now moved toward precisely this model, including plans for progressive vaccination zones, certified compartments, stronger diagnostics, improved livestock identification and regional cooperation through SADC.

AHI View

The 2025–26 South African FMD epidemic demonstrates the difference between containing an outbreak and preventing an outbreak. A farm can have excellent hygiene, controlled access, disinfected vehicles and trained staff and still be vulnerable if the surrounding livestock population has insufficient immunity and animal movements allow the virus to circulate.

The most important investment, therefore, is not the response after the first positive animal. It is the national capacity to maintain surveillance, vaccination and biosecurity continuously enough that the first infected animal does not become the first infected herd — and the first herd does not become a national epidemic.

For South Africa, the next phase will be measured not only by fewer clinical cases, but by vaccination coverage, speed of detection, reduction in transmission, restoration of livestock movement and the reopening of export markets.

FMD does not threaten consumers in the same way that a zoonotic disease does. Its threat is economic: lost milk, lost productivity, animal welfare impacts, culling costs, movement restrictions, trade disruption and pressure on the livelihoods of livestock farmers.

That makes the disease a national animal-health and food-security issue — even when it is not a human health threat.